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What Determines the Performance of Graduates?
Evidence From Top Business Schools
Matt Peterson
ABSTRACT. There are hundreds of MBA programs in the United States and abroad
graduating thousands of MBAs each year. An MBA is thought to be a very marketable
degree with broad applications and a high starting salary. There are many factors that
affect the salaries of MBA graduates and the reported starting salary of graduates varies
substantially among programs. What factors influence these differences? I investigate the
specific determinants of business school graduates’ salaries. The rank or selectivity of an
MBA program is the most important factor that determines an MBA graduate’s starting
salary.

I. Introduction
Many economists are interested in the factors that affect salaries. In
today’s uncertain economy, the importance of the return to higher
education is greater than ever before. With the recent financial crisis and
many people out of work, the opportunity cost of going back to school is
now lower for many people. A Masters of Business Administration
(MBA) is known to be a very marketable degree with broad applications
and a high starting salary; thus, MBA programs have seen a rise in
applications. MBA programs, while opening doors for high income, also
have a high up-front cost.
Master’s of Business Administration programs throughout the world
have gained prominence largely due to the high starting salaries that
graduates command. What influences these salaries, and how do they
vary among schools? Schools compete for the best candidates based on
characteristics that also influence success after graduation from the MBA
program. This paper uses regression analysis to identify the underlying
factors that determine this success, defined as post-graduate starting
salary, for recent MBA graduates at the top MBA programs in the world.

II. Literature Review
Many studies consider the determinants of wages and returns to
education, but few have looked specifically at the determinants of salary
on graduation from an MBA program. In the general human capital
51
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literature, studies find that additional years of schooling and experience,
as well as increased age, are correlated with higher salaries.
James, et al. (1989) consider whether graduates of more selective
undergraduate schools earn more than graduates from less selective
schools. They find that students who graduated from the most highly
ranked undergraduate institutions did not earn significantly more than
students of similar ability who went to schools that were not ranked as
highly.
Dale and Krueger (2002) find similar results to the study by James et
al (1989). They find that students who attended more selective colleges
earn about the same as students of comparable ability who attended less
selective schools. They also determine that the effect selectivity and rank
have on earnings might be biased because higher ranked institutions admit
students partially based on characteristics that lead to higher future
earnings.
Link (1975) looks at the impact of graduate school education on
earnings for a group of 843 male electrical engineers. Link controlled for
many things, the most interesting of which were the amount of graduate
education attained, the quality of that education, informal training, and
ability. He found that the variables dealing with quality and amount of
education had a significant effect on salary but only explain small
changes in salary. He found that actual experience, rather than formal
education, was better able to explain changes in salary. The most
interesting variable used in Link’s regression was the proxy for student
ability. A variable called “Intellectualism” was used to do this. This
variable is made up of other student characteristics like SAT scores,
percentage of Merit Scholars, median high school grades, etc.
Intellectualism had a statistically significant effect on wages; when it was
included in the regression the returns from education were diminished by
25 to 33 percent.
Behrman, Rosenzweig, and Taubman (1996) looked at a sample of
twins that grew up in the same home and had attended the same schools
before entering college in order to control for pre-university human
capital accumulation. They concluded that dimensions of college quality
like higher paid faculty, smaller size, and the granting of Ph.D.s had
important positive effects on wages outside of individual characteristics
and pre-college human capital investments.
Eide, Brewer, and Ehrenberg (1998) show that consistent
accumulation of high quality human capital begets more accumulation of
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high quality human capital. They find that attending a highly ranked
private undergraduate institution increases your chances of attending and
succeeding at a highly ranked graduate research institution.
Although I am unaware of any studies that predict the factors that
determine MBA salaries, there have been studies that look at the
determinants of after-graduation success of law school graduates.
Marshall (2007) finds what is intuitive; a combination of inherent ability
and institutional characteristics leads to eventual success in the careers of
law school graduates.
The Graduate Management Admission Council (GMAC) is the body
that creates and administers the Graduate Management Admissions Test
(GMAT.) The test is created by the GMAC with input from business
schools throughout the world. The GMAC claims that, “Studies continue
to show that only one factor predicts success in graduate business school
better than the GMAT exam: combining the GMAT exam with
undergraduate GPA” (GMAC 2011).
Yang and Rosa (2001) study the predictive power of the GMAT and
undergraduate GPA in determining success in an MBA program as
defined by graduate MBA GPA. They find that undergraduate
performance most strongly predicts performance in a graduate
management degree. The addition of the GMAT intensifies the effect on
MBA GPA. They find that that age and gender have no effect on
academic performance.
In a similar study, Graham (1991) studies the factors that predict
success in an MBA program. Graham uses MBA graduate GPA as his
proxy for MBA success. He includes the number of semesters in the
program, undergraduate GPA, age, ethnic background, gender, marital
status, GMAT score, MAT score (another test of ability), number of years
since undergraduate degree completion, and the type of undergraduate
degree earned (BS vs. BA). Graham’s results support the GMAC claims.
He finds a strong positive relationship between GMAT score and
graduate MBA GPA. Including undergraduate GPA strengthens the
results.

III. Data and Descriptive Statistics
My data come from the MBA rankings provided by The Economist in
2009 and 2010, the MBA rankings from U.S. News & World Report in
2008, and the MBA selectivity ratings from The Princeton Review in
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2008, 2009, and 2010. The years of data reported vary based on what
each company was willing to disclose. The variables reported by each
data source vary both in what is reported and, in some cases, how the
variable is measured. I will describe these nuances in detail.
Salary is used as the proxy for post-graduate success. The salaries
reported by each school are from self-reported graduate data. In The
Economist, the average salary for MBA graduates over the two years that
are reported is $93,662. The range of the MBA graduate salaries is from
$11,234 at Tillberg University in the Netherlands to $137,525 at HEC in
Paris, France. For U.S. News & World Report it is important to note that
bonuses are included in its salary measure. For U.S. News & World
Report, the average salary, including bonuses, is $98,553. It reports
salaries from $58,471 at Syracuse to $135,630 at Harvard. The Princeton
Review, like The Economist, excludes bonuses from its measure of salary.
The average salary over the three years of reported data from The
Princeton Review is $73,364 with a low of $45,215 at Texas Tech and
high of $101,988 at MIT. Regardless of data set, the salary data is selfreported by graduates. Because of this, the values may be inflated. The
results of the regressions will not likely be affected, though, because the
problem is common to all data sets.
Rank is a number assigned by The Economist and U.S. News & World
Report to indicate relative quality. Lower numerical rank indicates higher
quality. Rank varies based on the ranking system. The Economist ranks
100 schools worldwide. U.S. News & World Report ranks 65 schools,
with some schools assigned the same ranking based on a “tie” of the
underlying data used to determine rank. In general, the rankings are quite
similar. Stanford Business School and Harvard Business School are in
the top ten for both ranking systems.
Selectivity Score is a number assigned by The Princeton Review. A
higher numerical selectivity score implies greater quality. Selectivity
Scores range from 60-99 for a few hundred schools depending on the
year. The rankings are similar to that of The Economist and U.S. News &
World Report.
Percentage Women is the percentage of female students in an MBA
program. The Economist reports an average of 32 percent women over the
two years of reported data. The lowest reported percentage of female
students is 15 percent at The Indian Institute of Management, and the
highest percentage is 67 at the International University of Monaco. The
Princeton Review shows an average of 42 percent women overall. The
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lowest percentage of female students is zero at Marist, Cal-Sate Fullerton,
The University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee, and Loyola. The highest
percentage of women is 83 percent at Concordia.
Percentage Minority is the percentage of non-white students in an
MBA program. According to The Princeton Review, the only source
reporting this statistic, the school with the highest percentage of minority
students is Barry University at 78 percent, and the school with the lowest
is Indiana University at Kokomo with one percent minority students.
Work Experience is the average of the number of years a student was
in the work force prior to entering the MBA program. The average years
of work experience is around 5 years regardless of year reported or data
source.
Average GMAT is the average of students’ scores on the standardized
Graduate Management Admission Test administered by the Graduate
Management Admissions Council. GMAT scores range from 200 to 800.
According to The Economist, the average GMAT score for entering MBA
students over the two years of reported data was 658, or the 82nd
percentile. The highest is Stanford with a 730, or the 96th percentile, and
the lowest is International University of Monaco with an average of 513,
which is the 24th percentile. U.S. News & World Report, in 2008, reports
an average GMAT score of 664 or the 82nd percentile. The low is 598, or
the 60th percentile, at Bentley College and a high of 721, or the 94th
percentile, at Stanford. The Princeton Review reports an average GMAT
score of 576, or the 56th percentile, over the three years reported. They
report a low of 400, or the 13th percentile, at Francis Marion and a high
of 720, or the 94th percentile, at Stanford.
The averages for Undergraduate GPA vary greatly for MBA
programs. This may be because GMAT score and the type of work
experience needed for entry into a program can diminish the importance
of undergraduate GPA. U.S. News & World Report shows that the school
with the highest average undergraduate GPA is Harvard with a 3.63, and
the lowest is Wake Forest University with a 3.10 average undergraduate
GPA. According to The Princeton Review, the school with the highest
average undergraduate GPA is St. Mary’s with a 3.72, and the lowest is
Portland State with a 2.97 undergraduate GPA.
Faculty to Student Ratio is ratio of faculty to students at each school.
The Economist reports that the faculty to student ratio is lowest at both
EADA and INSEAD with a ratio of 0.10, and highest at EMLYON with
a ratio of 1.50. The Princeton Review data show a low faculty to student

56

Major Themes in Economics, Spring 2011

ratio of 0.03 at Wayne State, and a high of 1.00 at Ithaca College.
Acceptance Rate, reported by U.S. News & World Report, is the
percentage of applicants who were accepted into the school but did not
necessarily enroll in the program. The school with the highest acceptance
rate is the University of Oklahoma with an acceptance rate of 71.9 percent
and the school with the lowest is Stanford with an acceptance rate of 7.9
percent.
Student Score is a number specific to The Economist’s rankings and
is provided by the students at each school on a scale of 1-100 based on
perceived quality.
Faculty Score is a number specific to The Economist’s rankings and
is provided by the faculty at each school on a scale of 1-100 based on
perceived quality.
TABLE 1–Descriptive Statistics
The Economist
Mean
2009

Std Dev
2009

Mean
2010

Std Dev
2010

Salary

$96,795

$21,738

$90,529

$21,539

Rank

50.500

29.011

50.697

29.092

W ork
Experience

5.651

1.861

5.535

2.011

Average
GMAT

656.900

36.146

660.535

38.823

Percentage
W omen

31.290

6.632

32.070

6.873

Faculty Per
Student

0.671

.447

0.556

0.305

Faculty Score

52.570

30.534

53.364

31.022

Student Score

52.830

30.798

52.929

30.556

N

100

99
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U.S. News & World Report
Mean
2008

Std Dev
2008

Salary

$98,553

$19,177

Rank

32.277

18.712

Average GMAT

664.185

30.963

Undergrad GPA

3.392

0.164

Acceptance Rate

37.823

14.530

N

65

Princeton Review
Mean
2008

Std Dev
2008

Mean
2009

Std Dev
2009

Mean
2010

Std Dev
2010

Salary

$74,851

$14,713

$71,628

$13,504

$73,615

$14,896

Selectivity
Score

80.889

9.257

81.304

9.795

79.172

11.113

Work
Experience

4.692

1.882

4.829

1.755

4.954

2.664

Undergrad
GPA

3.295

0.240

3.282

0.142

3.291

0.127

574.885

61.573

574.290

79.250

580.397

67.169

Percentage
Women

0.547

2.889

0.369

0.107

0.379

0.102

Percentage
Minority

0.174

0.366

0.149

0.134

0.149

0.119

StudentFaculty Ratio

0.163

0.580

0.123

0.151

0.142

0.838

Average
GMAT

N

296

296

301
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IV. Method
Model
Mincer (1974) studies human capital as the central explanatory variable
for wage determination. The two principal elements of human capital in
the Mincer model are schooling and post-schooling investment (work
experience). Schooling is measured as years of education, and post-school
investment is estimated from age and length of schooling. Mincer shows
that years of experience should be used in a model to predict wage rather
than age because those with less schooling have more experience. A
model that only includes years of schooling is not sufficient to explain
wages because schooling does not account for all of an individual’s
investment in human capital. If it were, then earnings would be a simple
regression of logged earnings on years of schooling (Mincer 129). The
schooling model on its own cannot explain inequality of earnings among
individuals who differ not only in years of schooling but also in other
characteristics that contribute to the level of human capital (Mincer 45).
My hypothesis is that program rank or selectivity, along with preMBA human capital, affects post-MBA starting salary. In regression
analysis, complications arise because highly ranked MBA programs have
students with high levels of human capital. To separate the effects of
rank and pre-MBA human capital on post-MBA salary, I use a Two-Stage
Least Squares regression. The first stage regression equation is
Rank or Selectivity = B’X + e,

(1)

This is a traditional ordinary least squares regression where the dependent
variable is rank or selectivity of MBA program, and X is a vector of
relevant independent variables to predict rank. The second stage (2) uses
a labor-market model to determine salary.
ln Salary = B’X + e,

(2)

Here, the dependent variable is the natural log of the average salary for
MBA graduates by school, and X is a vector of the independent variables
that includes predicted rank as well as human capital and institutional
variables that should predict salary. Left out of this second stage
regression are variables that would most strongly predict rank.
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Equations (3) and (4) describe the models for the data from The
Economist.
Rank = " + $1 Experience + $2 GMAT + $3 Faculty-Student Ratio (3)
+ $4 Percent Women + $5 Student Score + $6 Faculty Score + e
1n Salary = " + $1 Predicted Rank + $2 Experience + $3 GMAT
+ $4 Faculty-Student Ratio + $5 Percent Women + e

(4)

Equations (5) and (6) describe the model when I use data from U.S. News
& World Report.
Rank = " + $1 Acceptance Rate + $2 GMAT + $3 UGPA + e

(5)

1n Salary = " + $1 Predicted Rank + $2 GMAT + $3 UGPA + e

(6)

Equations (7) and (8) describe the model for The Princeton Review
data set.
Selectivity Score = " + $1 Experience + $2 GMAT + $3 UGPA +
$4 Faculty-Student Ratio + $5 Percent Women +
$6 Percent Minority + e

(7)

1n Salary = " + $1 Predicted Selectivity Score + $2 Experience
+ $3 UGPA + $4 Faculty-Student Ratio + $5 Percent Women
+ $6 Percent Minority + e

(8)

Predicted Signs of First-Stage Coefficients
Rank and selectivity are proxies for quality of institution. For rank, lower
numbers indicate higher quality. For selectivity, higher numbers indicate
higher quality. Therefore, the direction of the correlation with each
independent variable in the first stage regression will depend on whether
rank or selectivity is reported. For the ease of explanation, I will discuss
the direction of correlation in this first stage regression with respect to
quality.
Work Experience: I expect that as years of work experience increase,
earnings will increase. If a student has work experience that is
increasingly meaningful, I expect her to attend a higher quality institution
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because of the additions to human capital from the knowledge gained.
Average GMAT: A higher GMAT score predicts performance in
business school and in the executive work world. I expect students with
higher GMAT scores to attend higher quality MBA programs than
students with lower GMAT scores.
Undergraduate GPA: GPA is an indicator of both intelligence and
a signal of ability. We expect that students with higher GPAs will attend
higher quality MBA programs.
Faculty to Student Ratio: The ratio of faculty to students at each
school is a proxy for the level of attention each student can expect to
receive from professors at each institution. A higher ratio suggests that
there are more faculty members available to help students. If more
professorial attention results in a higher quality education or better
retention of knowledge, then I expect a positive correlation with the
quality of the institution.
Percentage Women: Historically, men have earned higher wages in
the marketplace and so I expect an institution of higher quality to have a
lower percentage of women, all else equal, because high quality MBA
programs choose candidates based on prospects for success.
Percentage Minority: Historically, non-minority individuals have
earned more in the marketplace, and, much like the percentage of women
students, I expect an institution of higher quality to have a lower
percentage of minority students because MBA programs choose
candidates based on prospects for success.
Acceptance Rate: I expect institutions that accept higher percentages
of students to be institutions of lower quality.
Student Score: If students surveyed are honest and qualified to answer
the question of quality, then a higher score should indicate higher quality.
Faculty Score: If the faculty members surveyed are honest and
qualified to answer the question of quality, then a higher score should
indicate higher quality.
Predicted Signs of Second-Stage Coefficients
Predicted Rank: I expect students who attend better-ranked schools
to earn higher salaries. Because the rankings are created such that that a
lower number indicates higher quality, a negative coefficient indicates
that attending a higher quality school leads to higher wages.
Predicted Selectivity Score: Because selectivity scores are set up so
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that higher scores indicate higher quality, I expect that students who
attend schools with higher selectivity scores will earn higher salaries.
Work Experience: As the amount of work experience increases,
human capital theory suggests that wages will also increase.
Average GMAT: Average GMAT is included as a measure of preMBA human capital. As GMAT score increases, human capital theory
suggests that wages will also increase.
Undergraduate GPA: Undergraduate GPA is included as a measure
of pre-MBA human capital. As undergraduate GPA increases, human
capital theory suggests that wages will also increase.
Faculty to Student Ratio: Faculty to student ratio is a proxy for the
quality of human capital acquired in an MBA program. As faculty to
student ratio increases, human capital theory suggests that wages will also
increase.
Percentage Women: I include a measure of the percentage of women
in the MBA program in the regression to determine whether gender
meaningfully affects post-graduate salary. Women have historically
tended to earn less than men in their careers, so we expect a negative
correlation with the percentage of women in an MBA program and
earnings. For example, women above age 15 who worked full-time
earned 67 percent of what males earned on average in the year 2000
(Ehrenberg 2006).
Percentage Minority: Similar to the historical reported earnings for
women, minorities have tended to earn less in their careers than nonminorities, so we expect that there will be a negative correlation with the
percentage of minorities in an MBA program and earnings. Ehrenberg
(2006) investigates the earnings differential between black and white
American men and finds that on average, black men earn 67 percent of
what white men earn.

V. Results
The first stage regression is simply to gain an independent variable that
controls for the success factors that are implicit in rank and selectivity.
The magnitudes of the coefficients from the first stage regression will not
be discussed because their relevance is limited with respect to my claim.
In the second stage, because the model uses the natural log of salary, the
coefficients of the independent variables are calculated by [e^coefficient
-1 ].
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For the second stage, Rank or Selectivity is significant for all data
sets. For data from The Economist, on average, over the two years
reported, a one-unit change in rank corresponds to a 1 percent change in
salary. Recall that the coefficient is negative because a lower rank
indicates higher quality. For the U.S. News & World Report data, a oneunit change in rank corresponds to a 1.6 percent change in salary. Again,
the coefficient is negative because a lower numerical rank indicates
higher quality. For The Princeton Review data, I expect a change in
salary of 2.8 percent, on average, over the three years that are reported,
for each one-unit change in selectivity score. For The Princeton Review,
the coefficient is positive because a higher numerical selectivity score
indicates higher quality than a lower one.
Work Experience is significant for both The Economist data in 2009
and The Princeton Review data in 2009. For The Economist data, each
additional year of work experience would lead to an almost 3.0 percent
increase in salary. For The Princeton Review data, I expect that each year
of increased work experience would increase salary by 2.2 percent on the
average.
Undergraduate GPA was significant for both U.S. News & World
Report in 2008 and The Princeton Review in 2009. For U.S. News &
World Report, the negative sign on the coefficient is unexpected. The
surprising sign suggests a need for further investigation of potential
correlation with other independent variables. For The Princeton Review,
the magnitude of the effect of undergraduate GPA on salary is next to
zero.
Average GMAT score was significant for U.S. News & World Report.
As with undergraduate GPA for the same data set, there is a perverse sign.
This is further evidence of problems with this data set.
Percentage Minority was significant for The Princeton Review in
2009. The percentage of minority students in an MBA program was
positively correlated with salary. This indicates that a higher percentage
of minority students in a program is positively correlated with postgraduate starting salary. This is a sign other than predicted but a possible
explanation for it could be the increasing trend of East Asian and Indian
students of exceptionally high quality attending highly competitive MBA
programs.
The Percentage Women, and Faculty to Student Ratio, were not
statistically significant for any regression. Table 2 provides the results
from stages one and two for each data set.
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VI. Conclusion
As with any study, it is important to know the limitations of what is done.
With this paper there are many limitations. The most significant
limitation for this study is a suspect data quality. There are limitations of
what is reported by each data set and limitations of what each school will
actually release. There is some human error on the part of The Princeton
Review that was particularly obvious when I entered the data manually for
the total of 887 schools across the three years. There is also the issue of
incomplete data for many schools that may influence results.
TABLE 2–2SLS Regression Results
The Economist

Stage 1
Percent Women
Work Experience
GMAT
Faculty per
Student
Student Score
Faculty Score
Constant
R2
Stage 2
Predicted Rank
Percent Women
Work Experience
GMAT
Faculty per
Student
Constant
R2

Coefficient
2009

Std Error
2009

Coefficient
2010

Std Error
2010

-0.332
0.325
-0.115

0.375
2.674
0.130

-0.350
4.016*
-0.010

0.318
2.056
0.121

17.797**

6.413

14.423*

8.043

0.407*
0.235*
88.991

0.175
0.090
111.036

0.655**
0.205*
-7.106

0.159
0.081
101.543

0.383

0.538

-0.004*
-0.000
0.054**
-0.001

0.001
0.002
0.011
0.001

-0.007*
-0.000
0.027
-0.001

0.002
0.004
0.016
0.002

-0.037

0.042

-0.152

0.102

0.745

12.158

11.821**
0.567

** = statistically significant at the 1-percent level
* = statistically significant at the 5-percent level

1.364
0.310
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U.S. News & World Report
Coefficient
2008

Std Error
2008

Stage 1
-5.887

5.317

GMAT

GPA

-0.414**

0.046

Acceptance

0.350**

0.099

Constant

314.114**

37.425

R2

0.878

Stage 2
Predicted Rank

-0.016**

0.003

GPA

-0.204**

0.078

GMAT

-0.003*

0.002

15.123**

1.666

Constant
2

R
** = statistically significant at the 1-percent level
* = statistically significant at the 5-percent level

0.790

Princeton Review
Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error
2008
2008
2009
2009
2010
2010
Stage 1
Faculty
Per
Student

1.469**

0.560

2.093

3.033

0.058

0.054

Percentage
Women

0.071

0.107

-7.625*

4.435

-0.012

0.046

Work
Experience

0.079

0.174

-0.259

0.257

-0.179

0.170

Minority
Percentage

-1.017

1.477

5.228

3.500

0.060

0.038

GPA
GMAT
Constant
R

2

2.549

2.087

-0.021

0.018

2.658

3.875

0.125**

-0.005

0.074**

0.005

0.119**

0.007

0.118

6.360

41.571

4.535

0.590

12.821

0.716

0.400

0.528
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Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error
2008
2008
2009
2009
2010
2010
Stage 2
Predicted
Selectivity

0.004**

0.000

0.012**

0.001

0.012**

0.002

Faculty
Per
Student

0.000

0.011

-0.063

0.071

-0.002

0.001

Percentage
Women

0.000

0.002

-0.135

0.108

-0.000

0.001

Work
Experience

0.007

0.003

0.022**

0.006

0.012

0.005

Minority
Percentage

-0.007

0.030

0.173*

0.080

0.000

0.001

GPA

-0.050

0.043

0.000*

0.000

-0.059

0.128

10.993**

0.130

10.078**

0.178

10.335***

0.420

Constant
R

2

0.087

0.099

0.010

** = statistically significant at the 1-percent level
* = statistically significant at the 5-percent level

The majority of pre-MBA human capital variables do influence salary
in the way that theory would suggest, but the significance varies across
data sets and even across years for the same data sets. Any limitations
aside, my findings show that school ranking and selectivity are the
dominant explanatory variables when determining earnings for an MBA
graduate. These findings suggest that the current labor market for MBA
graduates pays higher salaries to graduates from higher ranked programs
even when controlling for individual student characteristics.
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